ODF Pre-Tool Safety Contract (T11)
Deterministic, pre-execution safety inspection for ODF delegation. This
adapter is a complement to, not a substitute for, OpenCode's native
permissions layer (permission.allow/deny in opencode.json).
#What native permissions already do
Native OpenCode permissions gate a tool call by tool + resolved path at the platform boundary. If a path or tool is denied, the host blocks it before the tool runs. This is the first line of defense and stays authoritative.
#What this adapter adds
Native permissions cannot see dangerous arguments inside an allowed tool's
payload: a destructive command passed to bash, a ../ escape in a read
arg, a secret literal being echoed, or prompt-injection text being delegated to
a sub-agent. scripts/odf-safety.js inspects those argument strings
deterministically before native prepare or legacy odf_delegate launches a
sub-agent.
It never executes commands — it only matches regexes against string/args and
returns an allow/block decision.
#Classes blocked
| Class | What matches | Example |
|---|---|---|
destructive |
dropdb / DROP DATABASE / TRUNCATE / DROP TABLE / rm -rf / |
dropdb mydb |
path-escape |
../ traversal, ..%2f / %2e%2e |
../../etc/passwd |
secrets-pii |
password=, api_key=, secret=, token=, emails |
password=<value> |
injection |
"ignore previous instructions", "you are now the system" | prompt override |
jailbreak |
"DAN", "do anything now", "no restrictions" | override phrases |
cross-root-write |
write/copy/move escaping authorized_roots (evaluated only when roots are supplied) |
echo x > /etc/evil |
#Every rejection names an executable continuation
Each block returns a safe_continuation — a real command/action the agent can
run instead, never a dead-end like "stop". Examples:
destructive: "Run the command in a scratch worktree or request explicit user consent for the exact target:mkdir -p /tmp/odf-scratch && cd /tmp/odf-scratch."path-escape: "Operate inside<root>:cd <root>and use relative paths, or get explicit authorization for the external path."secrets-pii: "Store the value in the environment or a secret manager; read it via$VARIABLEat runtime, never inline."injection/jailbreak: "Pass data as arguments, never concatenated into a prompt."
#EXPLORE read scope
EXPLORE is intentionally read-only and may inspect local files outside the
workspace and public web sources. The path-escape text pattern is therefore
not applied to EXPLORE delegation prompts; other safety classes remain active,
and cross-root-write still blocks writes outside authorized_roots. The
dedicated odoo_explorer agent denies edits, shell, and ODF workflow tools,
allows external-directory reads and web search/fetch, and searches the web on
every EXPLORE run. This exception does not grant write or database-mutation
authority.
#How false positives are measured before widening policy
The corpus is deliberately narrow to keep the false-positive rate near zero on normal ODF flow. Two guards enforce this:
scripts/odf-safety.test.tshas aallows-benign+corpus-false-positive-ratesuite asserting normal commands (echo,ls,cat models/product.py) and ordinary ODF prompts (create a new model,add a constraint) are not blocked.- The adapter scans only the user task payload (
args.prompt), never the enriched delegation prompt — the latter embeds system-instructive material (skill rules, the executor boundary) that legitimately names "DROP DATABASE" and would otherwise be a false-positive machine.
Before adding a new pattern or class, extend the benign corpus and confirm the false-positive rate stays zero; only widen scope for a proven real argument gap (e.g. a destructive command native permissions cannot catch).
#Schema
SAFETY_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1. inspectToolArgs output always carries
schema_version so policy changes are versioned and auditable.